Q & A

by Matthew Chavez

Daily Lobo columnist

U.S.-Turkish relations rattled this month as two crises converged. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a nonbinding resolution labeling the Ottoman Empire's post-World War I killing of 1.5 million Armenians "genocide," infuriating Turkish officials who deny it occurred.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul warned President Bush that passing the bill in the House of Representatives would damage bilateral relations, and Turkey's senior general Yasar Buyukanit warned that multibillion-dollar U.S.-Turkish military ties "will never be the same again" should the bill pass. The Bush administration worked furiously to oppose the bill on grounds it would imperil U.S.-Turkish relations and disrupt U.S. operations in Iraq, where about 70 percent of inbound air cargo passes through Turkey.

In a related crisis, the Turkish government announced it would conduct a military campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan to destroy Kurdish militants Ankara accuses of killing 13 Turkish soldiers. I spoke to Henri Barkey, chairman of the department of international relations at Lehigh University, to better understand the strategic implications of a possible Turkish military intervention. Barkey served on the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 1998 to 2000.

Daily Lobo: President Bush warned that the genocide bill's passage would "do great harm to our relations" with Turkey, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned it "would be very problematic for everything we are trying to do in the Middle East." How will Ankara respond if the bill passes?

Henri Barkey: If the bill does pass, the Turks will have to take action. I suspect they will slow down resupply operations over Incirlik (Air Base). They will do everything by the book. You won't be able to move things fast. That's going to create a backlog. You may have a boycott of American goods. More importantly, the unions that work in the airbase may go on strike, in which case the government will say, "There's nothing I can do about this." Things like that might happen. I don't see a total cutoff, because (doing so) will take U.S.-Turkey relations to such a crisis point that there might be no return. In the long run, both would lose a great deal from that - I suspect the Turks more than the Americans.

DL: Does Ankara have unstated motivations for invading

northern Iraq?

HB: The Turks have been very unhappy about the involvement of the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq (the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK), and one of their main goals is to stop it. A limited incursion is not going to do that - for that, you need a much bigger incursion. I should also say that the main issue is between the Turkish military and Turkish civilians. Turkish civilians are not interested in a very large operation, because they worry about the risks involved. The military may be more gung-ho in that respect, but I would argue that the (Turkish) military must know that this is very, very risky. The military is anxious to weaken the government and ensure that it is not effective in stopping (PKK) violence, because it won't allow a major operation against northern Iraq. The main driver behind this is domestic Turkish politics.

DL: Will Turkey stage a major assault on northern Iraq?

HB: Backtracking at this stage would make the Turkish government look exceedingly weak. I suspect they are trying to hammer out a deal whereby there will be a limited incursion. They've already been firing artillery for the last few months now. In addition, they may do a few airstrikes, maybe some helicopter-borne assault troops. Beyond that, if you want to bring in large equipment, there's only one entry-point, and that's the Kurdish-controlled Habur Gate. The Kurds are not going to let large equipment go through their territory.

DL: Will the United States give Turkey the green light?

HB: Any cross-border operation will be limited, and Turkey will have to get U.S. approval. I suspect the United States and Iraqi Kurds will say yes to a very limited operation in order to relieve the political pressure there and on the Turkish government.

DL: Wouldn't such an intervention disrupt the U.S.-Iraqi

Kurdish alliance?

HB: If this is played smartly, I think not. It actually improves Kurdish-American cooperation. Put yourself where senior Americans and senior Kurds are saying, "Look, we have this problem with the Turks, what are we going to do? Let's work on something." Whenever you work together to solve problems, you actually improve communications and you get people closer. Approval for a limited operation is not going to upset Kurdish-American dialogue, because your dialogue is about this other 800-pound gorilla out there that you need to somehow manage and cage.

DL: If an intervention is authorized, it seems to me the Kurds will blame the U.S. for not preventing it, for example, by placing a U.S. buffer force on the Turkey-Iraq border.

HB: The United States, first of all, is not going to take such belligerent action against Turkey, which is a NATO ally. Already, relations with Turkey are in bad shape. They're not going to make them worse - it's not in the U.S. interest. No. 2, the U.S. has no troops in the north. The reason the U.S. hasn't gone after the PKK lately is because it doesn't have the wherewithal to do anything. Every single soldier we have is completely focused on Baghdad and Anbar. So, even if we wanted to, we wouldn't be able to do anything.

Matthew Chavez is a political science major with a focus on international relations and a minor in Middle Eastern studies.